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STUDN NoTEs ON LEGAL ETmcs
TRIAL BY NEWSPAPER: SHOULD IT CONTINUE?
INTRODUCTION
This article is an attempt to present the existing problems, both
ethical and social, which occur as a result of the newspaper pub-
licity given to criminal trials and the events preceding the trial.
While the injustice of "trial by newspaper" affects both civil and
criminal cases, this article will be concerned primarily with the
latter since a study of the case material reveals that it is in the criminal
cases that the most flagrant violations of the rights of the accused
occur.
The greatest objection to publicity of criminal cases is directed at
the reporting of the events preceding the trial and those surrounding
the crime, and not so much the reporting of the events which trans-
pire in the courtroom; although there is abuse, even here. Here
again we are concerned primarily with the former.
The problems arising from the reporting of crimes and criminal
trials, along with some of the arguments both pro and con, and
various solutions to the problem are presented here.
CRnm RFPORTiNG
In Irvin v. Dowd,' the petitioner's brief had forty-six exhibits
attached to it containing a barrage of newspaper headlines, articles,
cartoons, and pictures that were unleashed against the petitioner
during the six or seven months preceding his trial. The newspapers
in which the stories appeared were delivered regularly to approxi-
mately 95% of the dwellings of the county, and, in addition, the Evans-
ville radio and television stations, which likewise blanketed the county,
also carried extensive newscasts covering the same incidents. These
stories revealed the details of the petitioner's background, including
a reference to crimes committed when a juvenile, his convictions for
arson, almost 20 years previously, and for burglary and of a court-
martial on AWOL charges during the war. He was also accused
of being a parole violator. The headlines announced his police line-
up identification, that he faced a lie detector test, had been placed
at the scene of the crime, and that the six murders were solved, but
that petitioner refused to confess. Finally, they announced his con-
fession to the six murders, and the fact of his indictment for four
of them in Indiana. They reported petitioner's offer to plead guilty
if promised a ninety-nine year sentence, but also the determination,
1366 U.S. 717, 725 (1961).
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on the other hand, of the prosecutor to secure the death penalty,
and that petitioner had confessed to 24 burglaries (the modus
operandi of these robberies was compared to that of the six murders
and the similarity noted). One story dramatically relayed the prom-
ise of a sheriff to devote his life to securing petitioner's execution by
the State of Kentucky, where petitioner is alleged to have committed
one of the six murders, if Indiana failed to do so. Another story
characterized petitioner as remorseless and without conscience, but
also as having been found sane by a court appointed panel of doc-
tors. In many of the stories, petitioner was described as the "con-
fessed slayer of six," a parole violator, and fraudulent-check artist.
Petitioner's court appointed counsel was quoted as having received
"much criticism over being Irvin's counsel," and it was pointed out,
by way of excusing the attorney, that he would be subject to dis-
barment should he refuse to represent Irvin (the petitioner). On the
day of the trial the newspapers carried the story that the petitioner
had orally admitted the murder of Kerr (the victim in this case) as
well as "the robbery murder of Mrs. Wilhelmina Sailer in Posey
County, and the slaughter of three members of the Duncan family
in Henderson County, Kentucky."
The petitioner's brief went on to say that on the second day of
the trial, devoted to selection of the jury, the newspapers reported
that "strong feelings, often bitter and angry, rumbled to the surface,"
and that "the extent to which the multiple murders-three in one
family-have aroused feelings throughout the area was emphasized
Friday when 27 of the 35 prospective jurors questioned were excused
for holding biased pretrial opinions . 2. "
In Stroble v. California,3 it was alleged by petitioner (ac-
cused of child molesting and murder) that newspaper accounts
of his arrest and confession were so inflammatory as to make a fair
trial in the Los Angeles area impossible. On the day of petitioner's
arrest the newspapers printed extensive excerpts from his confession
in the District Attorney's office, the details of the confession having
been released by the District Attorney at periodic intervals while
petitioner was giving the confession. The search and apprehension
of petitioner was attended by much newspaper publicity. Petitioner
was variously described, both in headlines and in the text of news
stories, as a "werewolf," a "fiend," and as a "sex-mad killer." The
District Attorney announced to the press his belief that petitioner
was guilty and sane. During the month of December, at a special
2366 U.S. 717, 726 (1961).
3343 U.S. 181 (1952).
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session of the legislature called to consider the problem of "sex
crimes," the District Attorney, at hearings held in Los Angeles
for one of the investigating committees, stated that he did not see
why sex offenders "should not be disposed of the same way" as mad
dogs. Los Angeles newspapers published accounts of these events,
and the accounts at times made reference to the murder with which
petitioner was charged.
These are two very good examples of what is commonly called
"trial by newspaper." In newspaper reports such as these the press
aided by prosecutors and police officers violate practically every
constitutional right that an accused criminal has, and as will be seen
the public-the citizen-is the only one who eventually must pay
for these atrocities.
Fortunately the Supreme Court reversed the conviction in the
Irvin case, finding that the news media had poisoned the minds of
the potential jurors in the jurisdiction.4 But the Court in Stroble
ignored the abuse and name calling tactics of the newspapers, and
also the damaging comments made by the District Attorney, and
based their decision solely on the publication of the confession made
by the accused, refusing to reverse the conviction.5
Trial by newspaper is more than just an expression with today's
modern methods of news dissemination. It becomes increasingly
harder to find jurors who have not read or heard reports of the crime,
and who have not formed a fixed opinion as to the accused's guilt,
making it extremely difficult to provide the accused an impartial
jury which he is entitled to under the United States Constitution.
But besides the problem of the accused getting a fair trial, there
are other factors which add to the severity of the overall problem,
the main one being the first amendment right of freedom of the
press. Let us examine these other factors.
THE INTERESTS TO BE BALANcED
At first glance, the problem of trial by newspaper seems to be
a clash between the first and sixth amendments (fourteenth amend-
4366 U.S. 717, 727 (1960). The Court in Delaney v. United States, 199
F.2d 107, 89 A.L.R.2d 1800 said:
"Where one's life is at stake-and accounting for the frailties of human na-
ture-we can only say that in light of the circumstances here the finding of
impartiality does not meet constitutional standards."
G Quoting the Court, 848 U.S. 181, at 193:
"Petitioner has not shown how the publication of a portion of that confes-
sion four days earlier prejudiced the jury in arriving at their verdict ....
The Court reasoned that the confession was part of the record, and the record
is available to the press, for what transpires in the courtroom is public property."
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ment where the states are concerned) of the United States Consti-
tution, but the problem is much broader than that, and ultimately
it is simply one of the right of the citizen to be informed versus his right
to be free from detriment through crime, and the question of which
one is more important.
The purpose of freedom of the press is to "assure unfettered inter-
change of ideas for the bringing about of social changes desired
by the public."6 James Madison and Thomas Jefferson were very
clear in their own minds about the place the press should have
in our free society. Madison, who offered the first amendment, said,
"The right of freedom of speech is secured: the liberty of the press
is expressly declared to be beyond the reach of government." Jef-
ferson was equally suscinct in this passage: "The basis of our govern-
ment being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be
to keep that right. And were it to me to decide whether we should
have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a
government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter."s
No one will doubt that the freedom to express one's thoughts
and opinions, and the right to exchange ideas lies at the root of
democracy, for without these, there is no democracy. But does the
right to exchange political ideas necessarily include the right to
incriminate one accused of a crime under the guise of news re-
porting?9 Besides his right to a trial by an impartial jury, does not
one accused of a crime have a right to be free from certain unwar-
ranted invasions of his privacy?-' Shouldn't the press be prevented
from publicizing certain material about the accused which is prej-
udicial, and which would probably be inadmissible at the trial? And
couldn't the newspapers be fined for contempt" for violating these
6 Roth v. United States, 854 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
7Daly, Ensuring Fair Trial and a Free Press, 50 A.B.A.J. 1037 (1964).
s Ibid.
9 See Comment, 36 Notre Dame Law. 77 (1960).
10 See Birmingham Broadcasting Co. v. Bell, 259 Ala. 656, 68 So. 2d 314
(1953), where the court said at 662:
A public character does relinquish a art of his right of privacy .... but
such a waiver is limited to that which may be legitimately necessary and
proper for public information."
See also, In re Mack, 886 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956), upholding on a right
of privacy theory a contempt citation against a news photographer for taking
pictures of the accused at the trial.
11 Some argue that contempt citations would undermine freedom of the press,
and would be in a sense, prior restraint, which is clearly prohibited by the Supreme
Court. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). However, in Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 290 (1941), Frankfurter dissenting, said:
"The conventional power to punish for contempt is not a censorship in
advance, but a punishment for past conduct, and as such ... is not offensive
either to the First or Fourteenth Amendments."
See also Consensus of Reform of Sensational Reporting, 20 J. Am. Jud.
Soc'y. 83, 84 (1936).
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rights of the accused, and for interfering with the administration of
justice? It seems to be within the realm of possibility.
An argument can be made that contempt citations are uncon-
stitutional because they prohibit freedom of the press and free
expression, but there seems to be an important distinction to be
drawn between political speech cases and the newspaper contempt
cases. In the former, the ideas and utterances being suppressed go
to the very heart of the democratic process. But the opinions and
statements of the newspapers concerning a pending criminal matter
touch upon individual liberty, the preservation of which, after all,
is a prerequisite to a free society. Viewing the problem in light of this
distinction, there seems to be equally as good an argument sup-
porting contempt citations.
Publication of the arrest and arraignment of one accused of a
crime appears to be both appropriate and necessary, since the public
is entitled to know what progress police and other authorities are
making towards solving and preventing crime. But is there any
rationalization for publicizing the accused's past criminal record,
or for bringing out details of his family background, viz., that he
came from a broken home, or that he was born illegitimate, or that
his mother had been committed to an insane asylum. Does "free-
dom of the press" necessarily incorporate information of this type?
These facts are generally not allowed to go before the jury at the
trial, so why let them be printed in the paper, allowing the press to
do indirectly what the prosecuting attorney cannot do directly. And
in many instances it is the prosecuting attorney who gave the infor-
mation to the newspapers in the first place.
One reason for allowing collateral information is the Supreme
Court decision in Near v. Minnesota.12 In that case, which involved
an attack by a newspaper on the Minneapolis county attorney, the
Court condemned prior restraint as an infringement of the liberty
of the press. But the Near case did not involve trial by newspaper,
so the "prior restraint" test may not be applicable in the event an
attempt is made to prevent certain disclosures by the press of in-
formation which is prejudicial to the accused, and which would prob-
ably be inadmissible at the trial. Besides, the press has not been al-
lowed to go wholly unrestrained in all fields. Certain restrictions have
been levied where obscenity, libel, treason and espionage are con-
cerned, and in each of these situations it is presumed that some
right greater than the public's right to be informed is at stake. The
courts in obscenity cases have felt that there is no social value in
12 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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permitting the publication of such material. Libel, they say, is an
intentional unwarranted invasion of one's right of privacy, which the
press has no right to publicize. Treason and espionage come under
the evidentiary rule of governmental privilege, since it is felt that
the need for governmental security outweighs the need of the public
to be informed on these matters. If the newspapers can be re-
strained in these situations it is possible that they can be and should
be restrained in the criminal publicity cases.
It is said in the above mentioned situations that a right greater
than the public's right to be informed is sought to be protected;
then what of the accused's right to a speedy, public, and fair trial;
his right to confrontation and cross-examination of his accuser; his
right not to be compelled to incriminate himself; and his right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Each of these con-
stitutionally guaranteed rights can be violated by an overzealous
reporter in his attempt to "get the story," yet the press justifies its
actions on the basis that the public should be informed. To subject
the accused to a "public" trial by the press without his constitutional,
procedural, and evidentiary safeguards, and to allow the minds of
his judges and jurors to be poisoned by inadmissible evidence which
comes out of context and without benefit of cross-examination is to
simply tip the scales of justice against the accused, and to make
mockery of the sixth amendment guarantee of "trial by an im-
partial jury." Can we honestly say that restraint is not needed in
this area?
Some sympathizers of the press contend that publication of
information about the accused serves as a crime deterrent. The
thinking here, being, that the publication of information about the
accused's past, printing his picture in the paper, and associating
him with friends and relatives is embarrassing to him and degrading
to the friends and relatives, and thus, discourages future crime on
his part, and also discourages those who may be about to commit
a crime of some sort. However, it is difficult to see how the mere
publication of a criminals acts will have any sobering effect on
potential criminals who are about to perpetrate a crime. At any
rate, there doesn't seem to be any statistics available to substan-
tiate such a theory.
Another theory quite often expounded by those favoring freedom
of the press is that unrestrained publication of crimes and criminal
proceedings encourages police, prosecutors, and the judiciary to
maintain high standards while performing their official duties, for
[Vol. K4
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fear that the newspapers will criticize their actions.13 But in Penne-
kamp v. Florida,14 Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion said:
Of course freedom of speech and of the press leads to the en-
lightenment of a free people, and in restraining those who wield power.
Particularly should this freedom be employed in comment upon the
work of courts.... But the Bill of Rights is not self-destructive. Free-
dom of expression can hardly carry implications that nullify the guar-
antees of impartial trials. The need is great that courts be criticized, but
just as great that they be allowed to do their duty.
Undoubtedly, the press can be a great help in exposing public
officials who fail to properly exercise the responsibilities of their
offices, and this use of the press is not to be discouraged. But as was
pointed out earlier, our main objection is to the reporting of the
crime and the circumstances surrounding the crime, and not so much
a criticism of what takes place at the trial. (With exception, of course,
to publication of information which would probably be inadmis-
sible at the trial, and the publishing of events in the courtroom which
the jury is not supposed to hear or see.)
Thus far, our attention has been directed more or less at the
public's right to be informed, or why the press should publish re-
ports of crimes and criminal trials. Now we turn our attention to the
right of the accused criminal to a fair trial, and the right of the
public to be free from detriment through crime.15
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. . . .."I The guar-
antee of the sixth amendment is made applicable to state prosecu-
tions by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 7 An
essential ingredient of that right is that an accused be tried by jurors
whose verdict is based solely upon a consideration of competent
evidence received in open court. Yet in many instances, far too
many, the accused is tried in the daily newspapers by editors and
reporters who are totally ignorant of trial procedure and the rules
of evidence.' One need go no further than his daily newspaper to
13 Craig v. Haney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947), where publication in a newspaper
vehemently attacked the trial judge. See also Bridges v. California, 814 U.S. 252
(1941), and Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
14328 U.S. 331, 336 (1946).
15 This applies, of course, to the right of every citizen to have a fair trial,
and the right of the public to have criminals punished.
10 U.S. Constitution, Amend. VI.
17 In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-
73 (1948).
18 See examples of reports of crimes which violate the rules of evidence
and the accused's rights, supra 1-3.
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find examples of the type of abuse which was levied at the defend-
ants in the Irvin and Stroble cases.
In criminal actions, certain evidence is excluded because of its
tendency to "confuse, mislead, or prejudice the juries."19 Mere sus-
picion, choice of possibility or probability, surmise, speculation, con-
jecture, and insinuations are not regarded as evidence in a judicial
proceeding,20 but all of these can be found in reports of criminal
cases by the newspapers, especially where the crime involved is a
violent one or is a sex crime. Can the accused be afforded a fair
trial when during the months and weeks preceding the trial the
community and the area from which his jurors must be drawn is
saturated with accounts by the newspapers of every aspect of the
crime, including: the investigation; the accused's past criminal ac-
tivities; the capture; the confession, whether it be voluntary or in-
voluntary; statements by the police and prosecutors whom may
not be called as witnesses at the trial, and whom the defendant
will never have a chance to cross-examine? Does the accused begin
the trial "innocent until proven guilty?"
Many will argue that through the use of the voir dire examina-
tion, change of venue, continuance, cautionary instructions, and iso-
lation of the jury that the prejudice generated by the publicizing
of the crime and the trial is minimized, with the end result being
a victory for both the press and the right of fair trial. This, however
does not appear to be a truism. First of all, voir dire examination
has been weakened considerably by the announcement of the Court
in the Irvin case2' that the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial
does not require "that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issue
involved." The Court went on to say, "it is sufficient if the juror
can lay aside his impression or opinion, and render a verdict based
on the evidence presented in court."2 2 Spies v. People of State of Illi-
nois, 128 U.S. 131; Holt v. U.S., 218 U.S. 245; Reynolds v. United States,
supra. Thinking such as that shown by the trial court in the Irvin
case allowed the accused in that case to be tried by jurors who ad-
mitted to holding preconceived notions as to the accused's guilt.23
The remedy of change of venue also leaves something to be desired,
since the burden of proving that defendant cannot get a fair trial
19 Report of the Crime Commission of the State of New York, 307, 319-20
(1927). This report revealed that publicity is capable of producing opinions and
attitudes.2 0 Conrad, Modern Trial Evidence.
21 See supra note 1.
22 366 U.S. at 723 (1961).
23 Ibid. See also Duncan v. California, 53 Cal. 2d 803, 807 (1960), where
three jurors with a fixed opinion of defendant's guilt were admitted to the panel.
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in the present venue is extremely difficult, because the proof neces-
sarily involves the task of showing that the minds of the potential
jurors have been so thoroughly prejudiced as to make it next to
impossible to change their minds.24 The same seems to be true with
the other remedies offered to the defendant, namely, that they are
of little help in overcoming the impressions which have been created
by the press.
From what we have seen, it is rather apparent that one accused
of a crime has the cards stacked against him once the newspapers
"go to work" on the case. Without really understanding the problems
they cause, and in many instances not caring,25 reporters and editors
alike make justice for the accused virtually impossible, and at the
same time, prevent the governments, state and federal, from making
adequate prosecutions of criminals who, in most instances, right-
fully belong behind bars. But still another problem exists within
the main problem, and that is the cost to the taxpayer, arising out
of reversals and new trials.
In his dissent in the Irvin case,26 Justice Frankfurter said:
Not a term passes without this Court being importuned to review
convictions had in states throughout the country, in which substantial
claims are made that a jury trial has been distorted because of in-
flammatory newspaper accounts....
It would be interesting indeed if the cost, the needless cost, of
excess litigation due to prejudicial newspaper publicity could be
determined. Undoubtedly, the figure if it were ascertainable would
run into millions of dollars. Not only is there a shameful waste of
money and human resources every time a trial is continued or re-
versed, the burden of which is usually borne by the state or federal
government since in many instances the accused is an indigent; but
quite often the criminal, because his rights have been so flagrantly
violated, is allowed to go free! What rationalization can there be for
allowing the press to limit the effectiveness of our system of justice,
and at the same time increase the cost of criminal prosecution to
ridiculous proportions? Is freedom of the press the justification for
these anomalies? Just how great is this need of the public to know
all the gory details of the crime; or the need to read statements by
the accused and others made at a time when their emotions rather
than their intelligence guides their actions; or the need to participate
vicariously in the investigation and the trial through the eyes of the
24See supra note 22.25 Polls taken at press conventions show that some newspapermen are aware
of and concerned about the problem of "trial by newspaper.'26 366 U.S. at 730 (1961).
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reporter or editor who is more interested in a promotion or selling
newspapers than in seeing that the rights of the accused are not
violated? The interests of all concerned don't seem to balance out
very well. In fact, it appears that what you have is a system where
the press profits due to increased subscriptions caused by sensa-
tional crime reporting; the state and federal governments being
burdened with additional costs in the prosecution of criminals, due to
the mistrials, reversals, continuances, etc. (And it seems appropriate
to add that ultimately the public will pay for the additional costs
of prosecutions through increased taxation.) Criminals are allowed
to be turned loose on society because they could not get a fair
trial, yet the instigator of it all, the press, is permitted to go un-
punishedl It is strange indeed, this system which penalizes so many
while letting the violator remain undisciplined.
A SOLUTION
In attempting to arrive at any type of workable solution to com-
bat the injustice of "trial by newspaper" one must at all times bear
in mind the first amendment, and the guarantees of freedom of the
press.
The old adage that "an ounce of prevention is worth a .pound of
cure" is as true in relation to the problem of "trial by newspaper"
as it is to any other. It would certainly be worthwhile to attempt to
find a method which would prevent "trial by newspaper" as opposed
to one which would merely punish for such misconduct. The solution
herein proposed is to stop the information at its source, the police
and prosecuting attorneys being the main source, and ways in which
these groups can lawfully be prevented from divulging prejudicial
material to the newspapers.
The problem, as it pertains to the police, would be a relatively
simple one. Since police and other law enforcement officers are all
officials of the state, their behavior as its affects the governmental
process of conducting trials can be regulated by the state by statute,2r
or by the local bar association, or by the police department.2 8 Since
the police and courts must act collectively in preventing crime and
providing justice for all, it necessarily follows that any action on the
part of the police, or the judiciary, which would tend to impair the
smooth functioning of these governmental processes could lawfully
and constitutionally be prohibited.
2 7 Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497, (1949); cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).28 The bar association could take disciplinary action against those who violate
Canon 20, and the police could establish some similar standard,
[Vol
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The problem so far as it is related to prosecuting and defense
attorneys still does not present too great an enigma. The actions of
attorneys could be closely checked, either by a strict application
of Canon 20,29 or a revision and redrafting of the Canon to make it
more useful.30 Canon 20 was designed to prevent attorneys from
divulging information to the newspapers, but it has been very in-
effective either because its wording is ambiguous, or because the
Bar has lagged in its enforcement of the Canon.31 From reading the
Canon one might surmise that the latter of the two reasons best
contributes to its ineffectiveness. At any rate, it appears that a strict
enforcement of the Canon with internal disciplinary action for its
violation would certainly prevent the divulgence of a substantial
amount of the information which tends to prejudice the people
against the accused.
Removing the police and attorneys from the picture as an in-
formation source would do a great deal to alleviate the problem, but
it may be doubted if this would be wholly effective in light of the
newsman's statutory privilege against being compelled to reveal his
source of information.32 In states where these statutes are in force,
the police and attorneys could make statements to reporters without
fear of being exposed. Therefore the problem cannot be eliminated
by attacking the source of the information, but will require other
measures to complement it.
The solution which would seem to have the best possible chance
of success is one which would provide a statute enumerating the
types of information which should not be printed by the press,
along with the English rule of fining for contempt those who violate
the statute. The statute would set out the types of material that are
prejudicial to the accused, and this would act as a guideline for the
reporters and editors when writing their stories. This has long been
one of the arguments of reporters and editors, viz., that they are
not lawyers, and therefore, they have no way of knowing what is and
what is not admissible at the trial.
29 American Bar Association Professional Code of Ethics. Canon 20 reads in
part: t "Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated liti-
gation may interfere wvith a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice
the due administration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned .. "
3) Situations which might call for statements to the press might be enumer-
ated in the Canon.
31 No cases were found involving an interpretation of Canon 20. But see,
Opinion 199 of the A.B.A. Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievance
(1935), reprinted in A.B.A., Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances 400 (1957).
S
32 Compulsory Disclosure of a Newsman's Source, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 243
(1959). Most states grant the newsman's privilege by statute.
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If a statute were drafted it might contain language to this effect:
Sec. 2. OMISSION OF PREJUDICIAL INFORMATION-The fol-
lowing items should be omitted from the newspaper reports of crimes
and criminal trials:
1. Confessions-voluntary or involuntary. Until it is determined whether
confessions will be admissible at the trial, they should not be printed.
2. The Accused's Past Criminal Activities-These are usually prejudicial
and inadmissible.
3. Tangible Evidence-Until it is determined whether evidence con-
necting the defendant with the crime was obtained under a legal
search and seizure, and the extent of its admissibility at the trial,
such evidence should not be printed.
4. Statements by Unsworn Witnesses-Statements made by witnesses
who are not required to testify at the trial, and who the defendant
will not have opportunity to cross-examine should not be printed.
5. Events and Proceedings From Which the Jury Has Been Excluded-
Events and proceedings which take place in the courtroom which
the jury is not supposed to know should not be printed. This would
occur at pretrial conferences and hearings.
While more detail would be needed to draft a workable statute,
the example set forth above would present the draftsman a good
framework with which to begin.
For any statute to be effective for the purpose for which it is
designed, it must necessarily be buttressed by some sort of punish-
ment for its violation. The English courts have long recognized the
doctrine of criminal contempt, and have seen fit to develope it and
apply it to the press where news reports of a crime endanger the
fairness of a trial. In Roach v. Garvin,33 the English court said:
There are three different sorts of contempt. One kind of contempt
is scandalizing the Court itself. There may be likewise a contempt of
this Court in abusing parties who are concerned in causes here. There
may be also a contempt of this Court, in prejudicing mankind against
persons, before the cause is heard.
While this statement of the English court might not have been di-
rected at newspapers, it is plain to see that the court in that country
very early recognized that one accused of crime could be denied
a fair trial if his jurors were prejudiced against him before the trial.
The English court also recognized that the contempt power was the
most effective way of dealing with this outside interference with
the judiciary process. I think that the contempt power could be
similarly used in this country,34 even though the Supreme Court has
332 Atk. 469 (1742).
34See Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States (1928);
28 Col. L. Rev. 401, 525 (1938); 48 Yale L.J. 54 (1938); 7 Ceo. Wash. L. Rev.
234 (1938).
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ruled that one cannot constitutionally be held in contempt of court
unless the utterances will create a "clear and present danger" that
they will influence the determination of a case.35
The decision of the Court in Irvin v. Dowd 6 suggests that the
Court is beginning to take cognizance of the undesirable consequences
of excessive and unrestrained pretrial publicity. The Warren Report,3 7
too, gives an indication that the Supreme Court may be changing
its attitude about "trial by newspaper," and might be ready to extend
the use of the contempt power. At any rate, it appears to be a good
bet that contempt charges against newspapers may be seen more
in the future than they have been in the past, at least in criminal
cases.3
8
The American Bar Association has shown that it is concerned
about the problem, and has recently appointed a panel of eleven
nationally prominent lawyers and judges to serve as the Advisory
Committee on Fair Trial-Free Press.39 The committee will consider
the responsibilities of members of the bar, as well as responsibilities
of law enforcement officials, the press, television and radio, as they
relate to preservation of fair trial and avoidance of prejudicial pub-
licity. Although the over-all national program will require three
years to complete, the fair trial and free press phase of the program
will be accorded priority, because of its urgency in the light of the
Warren Commission's findings.
CONCLUSION
As can be seen, the problem of "trial by newspaper" is not just
a legal ethics problem, but touches other phases of our society. It seems
clear that the problem cannot be solved merely by "taking the Bar
by the horns." Nor can we leave the problem to the journalists,
for though they would have us believe that theirs is purely a public
interest, "their motive is the sordid one of increasing their profits,
unmindful of the result to the unfortunate wretch who may ulti-
mately have to stand his trial for murder."40 The answer must come,
35 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
36 See supra note 1.
3 7 Report of the Committee headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren, and
formed to investigate the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, the arrest
and killing of Lee Harvey Oswald, and the trial of Jack Ruby.
38 The Bridges case, the Pennekamp case, and the Craig case, see supra
notes 35, 14, and 13 respectively, did not involve jury trials, and it is possible
that the "clear and present danger" test will not be used in cases where a jury,
rather than a judge, is the fact finder.39 American Bar Association News, Dec. 6, 1964.4 0 Gilman, The Truth Behind the News (June, 1933), 29 American Mer-
cury 139.
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if at all, from the legislatures through the enactment of a law pre-
venting the printing of certain types of prejudicial information, along
with the use of the contempt power by a wise and intelligent
judiciary.
William R. Hamlin
